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CLASS ACTIONS REMOVABILITY AND THE CHANGING 
BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT:  
DART CHEROKEE BASIN OPERATING CO. V. OWENS 
 
Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens, 135 S. Ct. 547 (2014) 
Stephen Carr* 
“[T]he history of the Supreme Court, as of the Common 
Law, derives meaning to no small degree from the 
cumulative details which define the scope of its business, 
and the forms and methods of performing it—the Court’s 
procedure, in the comprehensive meaning of the term. Not 
merely is its work of technical adjudication inseparably 
related to the procedural rules and practices of the Court. The 
essentially political significance of the Supreme Court’s 
share in the operations of the Union can hardly be 
overemphasized.”1 
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INTRODUCTION 
Problems of appellate jurisdiction are, by their nature, mainly 
pragmatic problems. The U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals are forced to 
balance the need to provide timely, effective appellate review of district 
court decisions against the understandable desire for judicial economy.2 
                                                                                                                     
 * Law Clerk, Honorable Jay P. Cohen, Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal; J.D., 2015, 
University of Florida Levin College of Law; M.A. 2009, Eastern Michigan University; B.S. 2006, 
Eastern Michigan University. I would like to thank all the staff and members of the Florida Law 
Review for their friendship. I would also like to express my sincere appreciation for the Law 
Review’s faculty adviser Professor Dennis Calfee, who does so many things, big and small, to 
make the Florida Law Review a great publication and organization.  
 1. FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT vi 
(Johnson Reprint Co., 1972).  
 2. See, e.g., Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978) (discussing the 
challenges of appellate jurisdiction and endorsing limited exceptions to the final order doctrine, 
1
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In addition to this inherent tension between fairness and economy, the 
law is constantly evolving, causing caseloads to wax and wane, and 
continuously forcing the circuit courts to react by expanding and 
contracting their rules of appellate jurisdiction.3 The U.S. Code generally 
limits appellate review to “final decisions,”4 and the U.S. Supreme Court 
has usually instructed the circuit courts to take a narrow view of what 
constitutes a “final” decision.5 Nevertheless, difficult cases remain.6 
Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens7 was not supposed to 
be a difficult case. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve 
an issue that had arisen only in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit.8 According to at least one commentator, the issue presented was 
so simple that “the answer would seem transparently obvious to any first-
year civil procedure student hoping for a passing grade.”9 At oral 
argument, Justice Elena Kagan did not hesitate to express her agreement 
with the petitioner (Dart) on the merits and speculated that most of the 
Court shared her view as well.10 However, Justice Kagan would later 
break from the majority’s decision, which sided with Dart on the merits, 
                                                                                                                     
which requires truly final decisions before licensing appellate review). The specific ruling in 
Coopers & Lybrand was largely overruled by Rule 23(f), which now allows for interlocutory 
appeals of decisions denying or granting class certification. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f). 
 3. See Martin H. Redish, The Pragmatic Approach to Appealability in the Federal Courts, 
75 COLUM. L. REV. 89 (1975) (discussing the federal courts’ pragmatic approach to the final 
judgment rule). In the twelve-month period preceding March 31, 2014, the eleven U.S. Circuit 
Courts of Appeals plus the D.C. Circuit terminated a total of 56,354 appeals while 41,588 appeals 
remained pending. U.S. COURTS, FED. JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS, tbl. B, available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistic
s/2014/tables/B00Mar14.pdf (last visited July 1, 2015).  
 4. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012).  
 5. The only widely recognized exception to the final decision rule, the so-called collateral 
order doctrine, comes from Cohen v. Beneficial Indust. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). See 
PETER W. LOW, JOHN C. JEFFERIES JR. & CURTIS A. BRADLEY, FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW OF 
FEDERAL–STATE RELATIONS 715 (8th ed. 2014). While there are strong policy arguments for the 
final judgment rule, other exceptions exist when necessary to protect important federal rights. See 
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 10.4.1 (5th ed. 2007). 
 6. E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1292 grants appellate courts jurisdiction to hear interlocutory appeals 
in a variety of situations.  
 7. 135 S. Ct. 547 (2014).  
 8. Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens, No. 13-603, 2013 WL 8609250 (10th 
Cir. 2013), cert. granted 134 S. Ct. 1788 (2014). The Tenth Circuit was allegedly alone in 
requiring the defendants seeking removal to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act to 
provide evidence of the amount in controversy. See Reply in Support of Petitioner for Writ of 
Certiorari at 2–6, Dart, 135 S. Ct. 547, 2014 WL 825192, at *1–7.  
 9. Ronald Mann, Opinion Analysis: Court Stretches to Correct Anachronistic Tenth 
Circuit Pleading Rule, SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 16, 2014, 9:24AM) http://www.scotusblog.com/201 
4/12/opinion-analysis-court-stretches-to-correct-anachronistic-tenth-circuit-pleading-rule/.  
 10. Transcript of Oral Argument at 21, Dart, 135 S. Ct. 547 (No. 13-719). Justice Samuel 
Alito thought her assessment was still a little premature. Id.  
2
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and join Justice Antonin Scalia’s dissent.11 Thus, the final opinion created 
unusual alliances across ideological lines: Justices Scalia, Anthony 
Kennedy, and Clarence Thomas—all Republican appointees—were 
joined by the Democrat-appointed Justice Kagan in dissent.12 In the 
majority, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg was joined by fellow Democratic 
appointees Justices Stephen Breyer and Sonia Sotomayor as well as two 
Republican appointees, Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Samuel 
Alito.13  
This Comment seeks to explain the strange turn of events leading to 
these unusual alliances and to suggest that Dart provides an important 
window into the way the Court manipulates its certiorari jurisdiction to 
achieve substantive policy ends. It is not surprising that the Court 
stretched its certiorari jurisdiction (or at least failed to do its due 
diligence) in granting certiorari in a decision denying federal court access 
to a class action. The Court has gone out of its way in recent years to 
expand federal jurisdiction over class actions while simultaneously trying 
to defang the class action device.14 Although the Class Action Fairness 
Act (CAFA)15 has provided explicit support for expanding federal court 
jurisdiction over class actions under the theory that the federal courts 
provide consistent, higher-quality justice in support of national interests, 
the Court has not shied away from interpreting CAFA to its limits.16 In 
addition, Dart coincided with the Court’s other recent decisions 
attempting to clarify the pleadings standards in federal courts17 and 
featured a strong dissenting opinion below, all of which appeared to make 
the decision ripe for review.  
Part I of this Comment addresses the changes to federal removal 
practices brought about by CAFA and examines the procedural 
                                                                                                                     
 11. Dart, 135 S. Ct. at 558 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 12. See id. at 558. 
 13. See id. at 551 (majority opinion).  
 14. See, e.g., Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2320 (2013) 
(Kagan, J., dissenting) (“To a hammer, everything looks like a nail. And to a Court bent on 
diminishing the usefulness of Rule 23, everything looks like a class action, ready to be 
dismantled.”).  
 15. Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
 16. See Edward A. Purcell Jr., The Class Action Fairness Act in Perspective: The Old and 
the New in Federal Jurisdictional Reform, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1823, 1856 (2008) (“Thus, CAFA’s 
design seemed apparent. It sought to reverse the litigation trend of the preceding decade by 
bringing most multistate class actions into the national courts, and it sought to reduce or eliminate 
the problems that class actions created by subjecting them to what would purportedly be the 
superior and more exacting supervision of the federal courts.”); see also Gil Seinfeld, The Federal 
Courts as Franchise, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 95 (2009) (arguing the federal courts provide additional 
advantages to litigants beyond the classic, and somewhat misleading, traditional rationales of 
correcting bias and promoting uniformity and expertise).  
 17. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (attempting to clarify the Court’s 
plausibility standard).  
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background of Dart more closely. Part II argues that Dart shows the 
malleability of seemingly neutral principles of appellate practice and the 
need to consider carefully the practical repercussion of jurisdictional and 
appellate rules. The Conclusion discusses what modest lessons may be 
gleaned from a seemingly unique decision.  
I.  GETTING “IN” TO FEDERAL APPELLATE COURT 
The next two Sections describe CAFA’s removal provisions and the 
unique procedural history in Dart. CAFA altered federal court 
jurisdiction in important ways and demonstrated a congressional intent to 
have the federal courts exercise greater jurisdiction over class actions 
based only on diversity of citizenship.  
A.  CAFA’s Removal Provisions  
Few jurisdictional changes in recent years have been more significant 
than the changes brought by the Class Action Fairness Act, which 
expanded federal court jurisdiction over class actions by lowering the bar 
to removal of nationwide class actions.18 CAFA was the latest in a long 
history of reforms aimed at influencing substantive legal outcomes 
through manipulations of supposedly neutral procedural rules of 
jurisdiction.19 CAFA and Rule 23—the federal procedural rule on class 
action certification—have led to a number of important Supreme Court 
decisions on removability in recent years.20 Several of these decisions 
have involved CAFA’s removal provision, which allows defendants to 
remove class actions to federal court when minimal diversity exists 
between the parties—at least one defendant must reside in a different 
state from at least one plaintiff—and when the amount in controversy 
exceeds $5 million.21 Removal both defeats the plaintiff class’s original 
choice to bring the controversy in state court and provides defendants 
protection in federal courts—perceived to be friendlier to defendants’ 
interests, especially business interests, although actual evidence of bias is 
                                                                                                                     
 18. For a general overview of CAFA focusing on its connections to previous efforts to 
implement judicial reform and the ideological implications of such reforms, see generally Purcell, 
supra note 16. 
 19. See id. at 1825–51 (describing past efforts on jurisdictional reform and their rationales); 
see also David Marcus, Flawed but Noble: Desegregation Litigation and Its Implications for the 
Modern Class Action, 63 FLA. L. REV. 657 (2011) (describing the role of class actions as a 
procedural device meant to achieve the substantive end of school integration).  
 20. See, e.g., Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 134 S. Ct. 736, 739 (2014) 
(finding that actions by a state’s attorney general were not removable under CAFA); Standard 
Fire Ins. v. Knowles, 133 S. Ct. 1345, 1347 (2013) (holding that plaintiff class’s stipulation that 
it would seek less than $5 million in damages did not prevent federal court jurisdiction under 
CAFA).  
 21. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) (2012).  
4
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difficult to pinpoint.22 Perhaps more importantly to defense attorneys, the 
federal courts offer a standardized legal environment with a set of 
procedural rules that are consistent across the country along with recent 
precedents and rule changes that were generally hostile to class actions, 
for example, changes allowing interlocutory appeals for orders certifying 
classes and strict standards of certification.23 However, these changes 
also mean that the federal courts end up hearing more cases where state 
law provides the rule of decision.  
B.  The Litigation 
Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. and Cherokee Basin Pipeline 
(Dart)—petitioners at the Supreme Court and defendants below—were 
two oil and gas companies who, according to the putative class of 
plaintiffs, had underpaid royalties on certain oil and gas leases.24 Dart 
removed the putative class action to the U.S. District Court for the District 
of Kansas on the basis of CAFA’s expanded diversity jurisdiction.25 
Dart’s notice of removal alleged that the underpayments totaled $8.2 
million, enough to meet CAFA’s $5 million amount-in-controversy 
requirement.26 Owens—plaintiffs below and respondents before the 
Supreme Court—filed a motion to remand the litigation to state court on 
the ground that Dart’s notice of removal was deficient for failing to 
provide evidence supporting its allegation that the amount in controversy 
exceeded $5 million.27 Dart responded by providing a declaration from 
one of its officers that included detailed calculations of damages 
exceeding $11 million, but the district court read Tenth Circuit precedent 
to require the court to remand the case to state court.28 The district court 
believed that it could only base its determination of whether the amount 
in controversy was met on the notice of removal and motion to remand, 
                                                                                                                     
 22. Purcell, supra note 16, at 1885 (“[T]here was no evidence that bias or unfairness existed 
in state courts generally, and in spite of their extreme and sweeping rhetoric, not even CAFA’s 
most unrestrained advocates purported to show otherwise.”).  
 23. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) (allowing for interlocutory appeal of a decision to certify, 
or not certify, a class); Walmart v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2561 (2011) (refusing to certify a class 
seeking damages for employment discrimination on the theory that individual defenses undermine 
the predominance of common questions); Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1435 
(2013) (requiring that plaintiff class’s model of damages be sufficient to determine damages for 
each individual member of the class); see also Purcell, supra note 16, at 1887 (“Thus, CAFA did 
not so much save defendants from biased state courts as reward them with access to an alternate 
forum that they regarded as more favorable to their interests.”).  
 24. Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens, 135 S. Ct. 547, 551 (2014). 
 25. Id. at 552.  
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
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and it could not consider the additional declaration.29 Accordingly, the 
district court remanded the case to state court.30  
Dart petitioned the Tenth Circuit for review of the motion to remand 
under a provision of CAFA that allows appellate courts to review remand 
orders, which otherwise are not subject to appellate review.31 Appeals of 
remand orders under CAFA are discretionary though and the Tenth 
Circuit refused to hear Dart’s appeal by a vote of 2–1 and likewise denied 
Dart’s petition for a rehearing en banc on an evenly divided vote.32 The 
Tenth Circuit chose not to provide its reasoning for denying the petition 
and merely denied without comment.33 Dissenting from the order denying 
rehearing en banc, Judge Harris Hartz argued that refusing to hear the 
case would have the effect of “impos[ing] in this circuit requirements for 
notices of removal that are even more onerous than the code pleading 
requirements that I had thought the federal courts abandoned long ago.”34  
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address: “Whether a 
defendant seeking removal to federal court is required to include evidence 
supporting federal jurisdiction in the notice of removal, or is alleging the 
required ‘short and plain statement of the grounds for removal’ 
enough?”35 It was not until an amicus curiae brief from a public policy 
institute, Public Citizen, Inc.,36 that the Court discovered the possible 
problem with its appellate jurisdiction.37 Public Citizen argued that since 
28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(1) placed the decision to accept or deny an appeal 
from an order remanding the class action to state court squarely within 
the discretion of the circuit court, the only question properly before the 
Court, then, was whether the Tenth Circuit had abused its discretion in 
refusing to take the appeal.38 Since the Tenth Circuit did not consider or 
                                                                                                                     
 29. Id.  
 30. Id. 
 31. 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(1) (“[A] court of appeals may accept an appeal from an order of a 
district court granting or denying a motion to remand a class action to the State court from which 
it was removed if application is made to the court of appeals not more than 10 days after entry of 
the order.” (emphasis added)).  
 32. Dart, 135 S. Ct. at 552. 
 33. Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens, 730 F.3d 1234, 1234 (10th Cir. 2013). 
 34. Id. (Hartz, J., dissenting).  
 35. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Dart, 135 S. Ct. 547, 2013 WL 6665192, at *i.  
 36. Brief of Amicus Curiae Public Citizen, Inc., In Support of Respondent, Dart, 135 S. Ct. 
547 (No. 13-719), 2014 WL 3767421.  
 37. Dart, 135 S. Ct. at 558. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“After briefing we discovered a little 
snag: This case does not present that question [i.e. the question of whether parties seeking to 
remove to federal court must present evidence of the amount in controversy].”). 
 38. Brief of Amicus Curiae Public Citizen, Inc., In Support of Respondent at 6, Dart, 135 
S. Ct. 547 (No. 13-719), 2014 WL 3767421 at *6.  
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comment on the reasoning of the district court, Public Citizen argued that 
the Court was likewise barred from considering the merits as the only 
matter “in” the Tenth Circuit was the preliminary decision of whether to 
consider the appeal.39 Public Citizen suggested that the Court could either 
affirm the Tenth Circuit’s decision—because it had not abused its 
discretion—or dismiss the writ as improvidently granted.40  
Public Citizen’s brief came relatively late in the deliberations—about 
two months before oral argument—and raised a jurisdictional issue which 
the parties had not briefed.41 Oral argument focused largely on the 
jurisdictional issue and not the actual question presented.42 In its brief and 
at oral argument, Dart disputed the appropriateness of an abuse of 
discretion standard and encouraged the Court to decide the merits of the 
case.43 Ultimately, a majority of the Court was persuaded to Dart’s 
position, reasoning that the abuse of discretion issue and the merits of the 
case were not altogether separate issues and the obvious error in the 
district court order suggested that an abuse-of-discretion occurred in not 
reviewing and reversing.44 The next Part addresses the Justices’ varied 
views on these issues in greater detail.  
II.  ANALYSIS 
The following Sections analyze the reasoning of the majority and 
dissenting arguments in more detail and argue that questions of appellate 
jurisdiction cannot be completely explained by principles of appellate 
jurisdiction but instead reflect the judge’s personal understanding of 
which issues are of national importance. This is not to argue, however, 
                                                                                                                     
Under the terms of CAFA’s removal provision and governing precedents of this 
Court, the only matter “in” the court of appeals on an application for permission 
to appeal is whether permission should be granted. Absent grounds for reversing 
the court of appeals’ decision to deny permission to appeal, the merits of the 
district court’s decision are not before any appellate court, including this one.  
Id.  
 39. Id.  
 40. Id. at 25.  
 41. For a timeline of the briefs, see SCOTUSBLOG, Dart Cherokee Basin Operating 
Company, LLC v. Owens, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/dart-cherokee-basin-
operating-company-llc-v-owens/ (last visited July 1, 2015). 
 42. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.  
 43. Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, Dart, 135 S. Ct. 547 (No. 13-719) (“[A]n abuse of 
discretion is not necessary to be shown here.”); Reply Brief for Petitioners at 16–20, Dart, 135 S. 
Ct. 547 (No. 13-719), 2014 WL 4199270, at *16–20. 
 44. Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens, 135 S. Ct. 547, 558 (2014) (“Careful 
inspection . . . reveals that the two issues Public Citizen invites us to separate—whether the Tenth 
Circuit abused its discretion in denying review, and whether the District Court’s remand order 
was erroneous—do not pose genuinely discrete questions.”). 
7
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that a more principled approach would be superior, or even possible. 
Decisions to grant certiorari are inherently political—in a broad sense of 
the term45—and should be understood and analyzed as such.  
A.  The Arguments 
Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion focused on a line of argument 
raised by Judge Hartz’s dissent from the Tenth Circuit’s order denying 
rehearing en banc—that any diligent lawyer, after observing that the 
Tenth Circuit let the district court’s decision stand, would feel obligated 
to include evidence establishing the amount in controversy along with the 
notice of removal.46 The practical effect, then, of the Tenth Circuit’s 
decision to deny review was to foreclose the issue from further review 
and deny the defendants a right to which they are entitled under federal 
law.47 Moreover, the majority reasoned that even if the issue were limited 
to the Tenth Circuit’s discretion to take the appeal, basing a decision not 
to review on an erroneous interpretation of the law was always an abuse 
of discretion.48 Justice Ginsburg pointed out that the Tenth Circuit’s own 
precedents suggested a need to revise erroneous decisions where not 
reversing and remanding would create the opportunity that the erroneous 
view would “preclude[] any other opportunity for [the defendant] to 
vindicate its claimed legal entitlement [under CAFA] . . . to have a federal 
tribunal adjudicate the merits.”49  
Justice Ginsburg also pointed out the similarity between the 
procedural posture of Dart and another recent CAFA removal decision, 
Standard Fire Insurance v. Knowles,50 which itself had relied on 
supposed congressional intent to assert federal jurisdiction over large 
class actions of national importance in expanding the scope of federal 
appellate practice related to class actions.51 Justice Ginsburg also noted 
that Public Citizen’s brief on the jurisdictional issue arrived after all the 
                                                                                                                     
 45. Specifically, decisions to grant certiorari reflect the Justices’ personal views about what 
ought to be the important issues of the day, how they ought to be framed, who ought to decide 
them, and when they ought to be decided. As Dart shows quite well, different views on these 
questions do not always track political views in the narrow sense—Democratic appointees sided 
with Republican appointees in the case. Still, they are always decisions made based on belief and 
preference rather than neutral principle.  
 46. Dart, 135 S. Ct. at 552 (citing 730 F.3d 1234 (Hart, J., dissenting)).  
 47. Id. at 556. 
 48. Id. at 555 (citing Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990)). 
 49. Id. at 555–56 (citing BP Am., Inc. v. Oklahoma ex rel. Edmondson, 613 F.3d 1029, 
1035 (1st Cir. 2010)). 
 50. 133 S. Ct. 1345 (2013). The Standard Fire Court held that a putative class may not 
stipulate to total damages less than $5 million to avoid federal jurisdiction. Id. at 1348.  
 51. Id. at 1350 (“CAFA’s primary objective [was to] ensur[e] ‘Federal court consideration 
of interstate cases of national importance.’” (citing CAFA § 2(b)(2), 119 Stat. 5)).  
8
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other merits briefs, so Dart’s lack of briefing on the issue of whether the 
Tenth Circuit’s order was an abuse of its discretion to review could be 
excused.52 Moreover, all of the previous briefs and motions had focused 
on the merits of the issue, and the district court’s reliance on Tenth Circuit 
precedent should have put that court on notice of the basis of the district 
court’s remand order.53  
Justice Scalia, in dissent, offered a few alternative justifications that 
would have excused the Tenth Circuit’s decision not to take the appeal. 
The Tenth Circuit may have felt that the case was merely a poor vehicle 
for resolving the question presented or that time and docket pressures 
would prevent it from properly disposing of the issue.54 He noted that the 
Tenth Circuit’s order did not provide any reasoning for the denial and that 
the Court normally refrains from presuming that an appellate court based 
its opinion on an erroneous view of the law.55 He took issue with Justice 
Ginsburg’s—and Judge Hartz’s—argument that the issue was unlikely to 
arise again on appeal, noting that even discounting the possibility of 
incompetent attorneys, highly skilled attorneys and judges still make 
mistakes.56 Additionally, the issue could arise in a situation where the 
parties disputed the sufficiency of evidence for removal. The Tenth 
Circuit could review the decision and hold that, in fact, CAFA requires 
no evidence.57 Finally, Justice Scalia argued that the majority was 
applying waiver principles inconsistently, penalizing Owens for not 
raising the jurisdictional issue more thoroughly in its briefs but 
dismissing Dart’s failure to do the same.58 All of these possible factors 
amounted to good reasons, in the dissent’s view, for dismissing the writ 
of certiorari as improvidently granted.59   
B.  The Practical Approach to Appellate Jurisdiction 
Both Justice Ginsburg and Justice Scalia presented principled 
arguments for their positions. Justice Ginsburg pointed out that a decision 
                                                                                                                     
 52. Dart, 135 S. Ct. at 557 (“The parties trained their arguments in the Tenth Circuit, as 
they did here, on the question whether Dart could successfully remove without detailing in the 
removal notice evidence of the amount in controversy.”).  
 53. Id. at 557–58 (“And if the Circuit precedent on which the District Court relied misstated 
the law, as we hold it did, then the District Court’s order remanding this case to the state court is 
fatally infected by legal error.”).  
 54. Id. at 559. If the appellate court grants review, CAFA requires a decision on the remand 
order within sixty days. 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(2) (2012).  
 55. Dart, 135 S. Ct., at 559 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 56. Id. at 560 (citing the decision to grant certiorari in this case). 
 57. Id. at 561. 
 58. Id. (“[I]f the timing of that brief excuses Dart’s failure to address whether the Tenth 
Circuit abused its discretion, it should excuse Owens’ failure as well.”).  
 59. Id. at 562. 
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to review the district court’s order, vel non, was properly in the Tenth 
Circuit and that the determination not to review the order could be 
considered an abuse of discretion when the order was legally erroneous.60 
Justice Scalia had principle on his side as well, as he noted that the Tenth 
Circuit’s determination not to review the district court’s order included 
no reasoning and, therefore, did not actually present the question 
presented.”61 Ultimately, procedural arguments fail to provide solutions 
to many jurisdictional questions; disposing of the issues thus requires a 
substantive approach.62  
Justice Ginsburg’s opinion addresses the main practical issue—
whether, if the district court’s order were to stand, the erroneous rule 
would become cemented in place.63 While her opinion likely overstates 
the risk that the issue will never arise again on appeal, it seems probable 
that most attorneys in the Tenth Circuit will not wish to make precedent 
on so technical an issue and will comply with the district court’s 
erroneous evidentiary requirement. Allowing such a practice to continue, 
at least for the foreseeable future, represents a practical denial of a 
procedural right that CAFA provides defendants—the right to remove 
actions by filing only a short, plain statement of the basis for removal.64 
Thus, as a practical matter, the result in Dart seems justified.  
Nevertheless, it is important to put the Court’s decision to grant 
certiorari in context. In its 2013 term, the Supreme Court granted review 
on 4.2% of the petitions received on its appellate docket, or sixty-eight 
cases out of 1602 petitions for appellate review.65 This current rate of 
review contrasts with that of the 1980s, when the Court reviewed more 
than twice that number of petitions regularly.66 Presently, the Court has 
near total discretion in deciding when to grant certiorari,67 even for cases 
                                                                                                                     
 60. Id. at 555 (majority opinion) (“The case was ‘in’ the Court of Appeals because of Dart’s 
leave-to-appeal application, and we have jurisdiction to review what the Court of Appeals did 
with that application.” (citation omitted)). 
 61. Id. at 558–59 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Once we found out that the issue presented 
differed from the issue we granted certiorari to review, the responsible course would have been 
to confess error and to dismiss the case as improvidently granted.”). 
 62. See Redish, supra note 3, at 89–92.  
 63. Dart, 135 S. Ct. at 556. 
 64. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) (2012).  
 65. The Supreme Court—The Statistics, 128 HARV. L. REV. 401, 409 tbl.2(b) (2014). This 
figure does not include the Court’s miscellaneous other dockets. Appeals through other means are 
even less likely to make it to the Court. Id.  
 66. Adam Liptak, The Case of the Plummeting Supreme Court Docket, N.Y.TIMES (Sept. 
28, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/29/us/29bar.html. 
 67. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1254, 1257 (providing discretion to the Court when reviewing federal 
appellate decisions or decisions of the state’s highest court).  
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arguably based on state law.68 Recent reporting also highlights the ways 
in which the attorneys petitioning the Court play an important role in 
determining when the Court will grant certiorari.69 The result of the trend 
toward greater discretion in choosing when to grant certiorari is 
predictable—the Justices shape the priorities of the Court to fit with their 
own perceptions of the important national issues needing to be resolved.70 
Corporate counsel and business interests are especially able to take 
advantage of the Court’s wide discretion as the Justices themselves often 
come from a corporate law background or show a familiarity and 
sympathy with business issues. Likewise, the Court has used its certiorari 
discretion to push to the forefront of national debate issues that it deems 
to be of political importance.  
CONCLUSION  
While Dart was certainly right on the merits of the question presented, 
the Court stretched to decide a case in which the correct interpretation of 
the law was clear to most observers of the Court’s precedents, the actual 
holding of the decision under review was unclear, and the stakes were 
low. The Court’s argument that the issue would likely not arise again 
because attorneys would automatically comply with the erroneous 
decision also shows that the right being vindicated was of little real 
importance.  
Dart shows, therefore, that when the decision under review is clearly 
erroneous, or the Court is interested in deciding a certain question or 
continuing a certain line of cases, the principles of appellate practice are 
malleable enough to accommodate review at any time. Two conclusions 
follow from this analysis: First, understanding and evaluating the 
Supreme Court’s certiorari jurisdiction requires a subtle understanding of 
the way the Court manipulates review to achieve political, social, and 
legal objectives. Second, observers of the Court and congressional 
overseers ought to be justified in asking probing questions of potential 
Justices prior to confirmation to try to understand how nominees’ views 
of national priorities will shape their approach to the business of the 
Supreme Court—that it is, how the Justice believes the Court should use 
its jurisdiction and procedures to shape government and society.  
                                                                                                                     
 68. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040–41 (1983) (announcing the Court’s new 
policy to assume that, absent a plain statement to the contrary, state court decisions referencing 
federal law reflect a belief by the state court that federal law required the result and are thus 
appropriate for Supreme Court review).  
 69. Joan Biskupic, Janet Roberts & John Shiffman, At America’s Court of Last Resort, a 
Handful of Lawyers Now Dominates the Docket, REUTERS (Dec. 8, 2014), 
http://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/scotus/ (reporting that an elite group of sixty-
six attorneys, out of 17,000 attorneys who petitioned the Court, were six times more likely to have 
their petitions granted, and that sixty-three of these attorneys are white and fifty-five are male).  
 70. See FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 1, at v–vi. 
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